



Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY

9489/33

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

May/June 2023

1 hour 15 minutes



You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
Section A: The origins of the First World War
Section B: The Holocaust
Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].

This document has **4** pages.

Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: The origins of the First World War

- 1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The word militarism includes two definite elements. First, dangerous and burdensome standing armies and large navies, with the evils of spying, fear and hatred that they bring with them. Second, the existence of a powerful class of military and naval officers, headed by a General Staff, who tend to dominate, especially at a time of political crisis, over the civilian authorities. From the Franco-Prussian War onwards, the armaments of all the Great Powers tended to grow larger and larger, and the financial burden became heavier and heavier. Armaments were alleged to be for defence and in the interests of peace. They were intended to produce a sense of security. What they really did produce was universal suspicion, fear and hatred between nations. If one country increased its army, its fearful neighbours were immediately frightened into doing likewise. So the mad competition in armaments went on in a vicious circle. This was made worse by the system of alliances. Germany and Austria, unsure of Italy's loyalty, believed they must increase their armaments to secure their own safety. France urged Russia to increase its army and build strategic railways against Germany and loaned half a billion francs on condition that it be spent for these purposes.

Militarism also implied the existence of an influential body of military and naval officers, whose whole psychological outlook was naturally coloured by the possibility, if not the inevitability, of an early war. War held out the prospect of quick promotion and great distinction. Quite aside from any personal motives, military officers had a high sense of national honour and patriotic duty, as they understood it. It was their supreme duty to be ready at any moment to protect the state by force of arms. To this end, every General Staff drew up and revised every year the most detailed plans for mobilisation. They generally held the view that it was advantageous to take the offensive. In a political crisis, therefore, military leaders exerted their influence to ensure that mobilisation was ordered at the earliest possible moment. But a general mobilisation really did make war inevitable, a process impossible to halt once begun. This was one of the greatest evils of militarism. In a crisis, precisely when it was most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear, the military would exert their influence to hasten decisions for war.

Another evil of militarism was that the plans of the General Staff were technical and worked out in absolute secrecy. Not only were they not known to parliament and the public, they were often not even known by ministers of foreign affairs, or at least their details and significance were not fully understood. The plans were calculated to bring military victory, regardless of their political implications which might be imposed on civilian authorities. And when war became 'inevitable', there was tremendous pressure on the civilians to accept the military arrangements. The military mind was much the same in all the countries, but there was a difference as to the extent to which the civilian authorities exercised control. The French general, Joffre, in 1912, exactly like the German planners, urged the necessity of disregarding Belgian neutrality, but while Moltke was allowed to build his whole plan on this, Poincaré was strong and shrewd enough to veto Joffre's views. Generally speaking, it can be said that this aspect of militarism – the influence of the military upon the civilian authorities – was a serious matter in the three eastern monarchies of Germany, Austria and Russia, but much less significant in France and Britain.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer.

[40]

Section B: The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

The importance of the intentionalist/functionalist debate has declined because the question of the undoubted significance of Hitler's ideological views for the overall context and goals of the regime has, over time, been somewhat split off from earlier debates about power structures. Although the concept of totalitarianism lives on, there is by now far wider agreement on the nature of the Nazi regime. Hitler's own role as charismatic leader, and the significance of an appeal to the Führer's orders, or to Hitler's will, are now widely seen as having developed in large part because of the increasingly decentralised structure of the state, with its lack of clear, institutionalised lines of authority. Hitler's 'intentions', while still central, thus did not translate into outcomes in any simple way, through a direct line of orders and commands in a streamlined state. Rather, Hitler's views provided a framework of ideological aspirations within which different organisations and people sought to 'work towards the Führer' and to implement the racially pure state which was the widely acknowledged goal of the Nazis from the very outset. The sudden shifts from the inhumane practices of persecution and exclusion in the 1930s, causing massive disruption of lives and thousands of deaths, through the heightened but still sporadic violence of the early war years, to the ever more efficient mass murder programme in the extermination camps, was obviously an increasingly extreme process. However, this process is better seen as a series of improvisations rather than in terms of any clear prior planning.

Accepting a combination of a focus on Hitler's intentions (or rather, his ideological obsessions and ultimate goals, without clear long-term plans for achieving his goals) with a state characterised by internal feuds and competition, still leaves open the question of explaining the transition to a policy of seeking total eradication of the Jewish race, rather than simply 'removal', including deaths, from areas of German settlement and occupation. It also leaves open a whole variety of far wider questions concerning the conditions and responses which made such developments possible. But the final switch to genocide remains a central puzzle. It is unlikely – given Hitler's work habits, his known desire to disguise the Final Solution, and his experiences with opposition to the euthanasia order – that a single, explicit order for mass murder would have been issued in written form, so the question is rather one of piecing together many often inconclusive scraps of evidence over a longer period of time to try to identify key turning points. Much detailed attention has been focused on the 'fateful months' of 1941, and particularly on the ways in which the fortunes of the Russian campaign were related to the erratic, uneven but dramatic radicalisation of policy. There was an unfolding process, characterised by wide variations in the scale of killing between different Einsatzgruppen, which cannot be explained in terms of a single order or command from Hitler. Rather, initiatives appear to have been taken on the ground, within a general framework of overall aims and objectives set by Hitler, and in the context of increasing brutalisation of warfare. Experiments with Zyklon-B gas, the introduction for German Jews of the yellow star badge and the pressures for deportation of German Jews in September, the prohibition of further emigration from Germany in October, and the gassing of Jews from the Lodz ghetto in Chelmno in December, were just uncertain steps along the road. Even by the time that Hitler talked about the Final Solution in early December, the precise shape this would take remained vague.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

- 3** Read the extract and then answer the question.

The fact that the establishment of a new international order after the Second World War occurred in the form of the Cold War and led to the formation of two blocs was a probable, but not inevitable, development.

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Thus, the realists on both sides were no longer able to counter the hardliners.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]